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An almost ideal coordination mechanism
for unrelated machine scheduling∗
Ioannis Caragiannis† Angelo Fanelli‡
Abstract
Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to dif-
ferent machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally
induces a game among the selfish job owners. The desirable properties of a coordination mecha-
nism includes simplicity in its definition and efficiency of the outcomes of the induced game. We
present a broad class of coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling that are simple
to define and we identify one of its members (mechanism DCOORD) that is superior to all known
mechanisms. DCOORD induces potential games with logarithmic price of anarchy and only constant
price of stability. Both bounds are almost optimal.
1 Introduction
We consider a selfish scheduling setting where each job owner acts as a non-cooperative player and aims
to assign her job to one of the available machines so that the completion time of the job is as low as
possible. An algorithmic tool that can be utilized by the designer of such a system is a coordination
mechanism [8]. The coordination mechanism uses a scheduling policy within each machine that aims to
mitigate the impact of selfishness to performance.
We focus on unrelated machine scheduling. There are m available machines and n players, each
controlling a distinct job. The job (owned by player) u has a (possibly infinite) positive processing time
(or load) wu,j when processed by machine j. A scheduling policy defines the way jobs are scheduled
within a machine. In its simplest form, such a policy is non-preemptive and processes jobs uninter-
ruptedly according to some order. Preemptive scheduling policies (which is our focus here) do not
necessarily have this feature (e.g., they may process jobs in parallel) and may even introduce some idle
time.
Naturally, a coordination mechanism induces a game with the job owners as players. Each player
has all machines as possible strategies. The term assignment is used for a snapshot of the game, where
each player has selected a strategy, i.e., it has selected a particular machine to process her job. Given
an assignment, the cost a player experiences is the completion time of her job on the machine she has
selected. This is well-defined by the scheduling policy of the machine and typically depends on the
characteristics of all jobs assigned to the machine.
Assignments in which no player has any incentive to change her strategy are called pure Nash equi-
libria (or, simply, equilibria). When studying a coordination mechanism, we are interested in bounding
the inefficiency of equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism. We use the maximum completion
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time among all jobs to measure the social cost. A related quantity is the load of a machine which is
defined as the total processing time of the jobs assigned to the machine. The makespan of an assign-
ment is the maximum load over all machines. Clearly, the makespan of an assignment is a lower bound
on the maximum completion time. The price of anarchy (respectively, price of stability) of the game
induced by a coordination mechanism is defined as the worst (respectively, best) ratio of the maximum
completion time over all equilibria over the optimal makespan.
We prefer mechanisms that induce games that always have equilibria. Furthermore, we would like
these equilibria to be easy to find. A highly desirable property that ensures that equilibria can be reached
by the players themselves (with best-response play) is the existence of a potential function. A potential
function is defined over all possible assignments and has the property that, in any two assignments
differing in the strategy of a single player, the difference of the two values of the potential and the
difference of the completion time of the deviating player have the same sign.
Coordination mechanisms for scheduling were introduced by Christodoulou et al. [8]. Immorlica et
al. [11] were the first to consider coordination mechanisms in the unrelated machine setting and studied
several intuitive mechanisms, including ShortestFirst and Makespan. In ShortestFirst,
the jobs in each machine are scheduled non-preemptively, in monotone non-decreasing order of their
processing time. Since ties are possible, the mechanism has to distinguish between jobs with iden-
tical processing times, e.g., using distinct IDs for the jobs. This is necessary for every deterministic
non-preemptive coordination mechanism in order to be well-defined. In contrast, in Makespan, each
machine processes the jobs assigned to it “in parallel” so that they all have the same completion time.
So, no ID information is required by Makespan. We use the term anonymous to refer to coordination
mechanisms having this property. These two coordination mechanisms are strongly local in the sense
that the only information that is required to compute the schedule of jobs within a machine is the pro-
cessing time of the jobs on that machine only. A local coordination mechanism may use all parameters
of the jobs that are assigned to a machine (e.g., the whole load vector of each job).
Azar et al. [4] prove lower bounds of Ω(m) and Ω(logm) on the price of anarchy for any strongly lo-
cal and local non-preemptive coordination mechanism, respectively. On the positive side, they presented
two local coordination mechanisms with price of anarchy o(m). Their first coordination mechanism
(henceforth called AFJMS-1) is non-preemptive and may induce game without equilibria. When the
induced game has equilibria, the price of anarchy is at most O(logm). Their second coordination mech-
anism (henceforth called AFJMS-2 is preemptive, induces potential games, and has price of anarchy
O(log2m). Both mechanisms are not anonymous.
Caragiannis [7] presents three more coordination mechanisms. The mechanism ACOORD, induces
potential games with price of anarchy O(logm). The mechanism uses the distinct IDs of the jobs to
ensure that the equilibria of the game are essentially assignments that are reached by a greedy-like
online algorithm for minimizing the p-norm of machine loads. [3] and [6] study this online scheduling
problem; the results therein imply that the price of stability of mechanism ACOORD is Ω(logm) as well.
A different coordination mechanism with similar characteristics (called Balance) is presented in [9].
The coordination mechanism BCOORD (defined also in [7]) has even better price of anarchy O
(
logm
log logm
)
(matching a lower bound due to Abed and Huang [2] for all deterministic coordination mechanisms) but
the induced games are not potential ones and may not even have equilibria. However, the price of
anarchy bound for BCOORD indicates that preemption may be useful in order to beat the Ω(logm) lower
bound for non-preemptive mechanisms from [4]. Interestingly, this mechanism is anonymous. The
third mechanism CCOORD is anonymous as well, induces potential games, and has price of anarchy and
price of stability O(log2m) and O(logm), respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only
anonymous mechanism that induces potential games and has polylogarithmic price of anarchy.1 Table 1
1Even though their mechanism Balance heavily uses job IDs, Cohen et al. [9] claim that it is anonymous. This is
certainly false according to our terminology since anonymity imposes that two jobs with identical load vectors should be
indistinguishable.
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summarizes the known local coordination mechanisms.
Table 1: A comparison between DCOORD and other local coordination mechanisms from the literature.
Coordination PoA PoS PNE Pot. IDs Preempt. Reference
mechanism
AFJMS-1 Θ(logm) - No No Yes No [4]
AFJMS-2 O(log2m) - Yes Yes Yes Yes [4]
ACOORD O(logm) Θ(logm) Yes Yes Yes Yes [7]
Balance O(logm) Θ(logm) Yes Yes Yes Yes [9]
BCOORD Θ( logmlog logm ) - ? No No Yes [7]
CCOORD O(log2m) O(logm) Yes Yes No Yes [7]
DCOORD O(logm) O(1) Yes Yes No Yes this paper
In the discussion above, we have focused on papers that define the social cost as the maximum
completion time (among all players). An alternative social cost that has received much attention is the
weighted average completion time; see [1, 5, 10] for some recent related results. Interestingly, the design
principles that lead to efficient mechanisms in their case are considerably different.
Our contribution is as follows. We introduce a quite broad class (called M(d)) of local anonymous
coordination mechanisms that induce potential games. The class contains the coordination mechanism
CCOORD as well as the novel coordination mechanism DCOORD, which has additional almost ideal
properties. In particular, we prove that it has logarithmic price of anarchy and only constant price of
stability. A (qualitative and quantitative) comparison of DCOORD to other known local coordination
mechanisms is depicted in Table 1.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions in Section
2. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of the class of mechanisms M(d) and to the proof that all
mechanisms in this class induce potential games. Then, the novel mechanism DCOORD from this class
is defined in Section 4; its feasibility as well as preliminary statements that are useful for the analysis
are also presented there. Finally, in Section 5, we prove the bounds on the price of anarchy and stability.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we denote the number of machines by m. The index j always refers to a machine;
the sum
∑
j runs over all available machines. An assignment is a partition N = (N1, ..., Nm) of the
players to the m machines. So, Nj is the set of players assigned to machine j under N . We use the
notation Lj(Nj) to refer to the load of machine j, i.e., Lj(Nj) =
∑
u∈Nj
wu,j .
A coordination mechanism uses a scheduling policy per machine. For every set of jobs assigned to
machine j, the scheduling policy of the machine defines a detailed schedule of the jobs in the machine,
i.e., it defines which job is executed in each point in time, whether more than one jobs are executed in
parallel, or whether a machine stays idle for particular time intervals. Instead of defining coordination
mechanisms at this level of detail, it suffices to focus on the definition of the completion time P(u,Nj)
for the job of each player u ∈ Nj . This definition should correspond to some feasible detailed scheduling
of jobs in the machine. A sufficient condition that guarantees feasibility is to define completion times
that are never smaller than the machine load.
Like the coordination mechanisms in [4, 7, 9], our coordination mechanisms are local. The comple-
tion time P(u,Nj) of the job belonging to player u in machine j depends on the processing times the
jobs in Nj have on machine j, as well as on the minimum processing time wu = minj wu,j of job u
over all machines.
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Our proofs exploit simple facts about Euclidean norms of machine loads. Recall that, for p ≥ 1, the
p-norm of the vector of machine loads L(N) = (L1(N1), L2(N2), ..., Lm(Nm)) under an assignment N
is ‖L(N)‖p =
(∑
j Lj(Nj)
p
)1/p
. By convention, we denote the makespan maxj Lj(Nj) as ‖L(N)‖∞.
The following property follows easily by the definition of norms; we use it extensively in the following.
Lemma 1 For any p ≥ 1 and any assignment N , ‖L(N)‖∞ ≤ ‖L(N)‖p ≤ m1/p‖L(N)‖∞.
We also use the well-known Minkowski inequality (or triange inequality for the p-norm). For machine
loads, it reads as follows:
Lemma 2 (Minkowski inequality) For every p ≥ 1 and two assignments N and N ′,
‖L(N) + L(N ′)‖p ≤ ‖L(N)‖p + ‖L(N
′)‖p.
The notation L(N)+L(N ′) denotes the m-entry vector with Lj(Nj)+Lj(N ′j) at the j-th entry. Another
necessary technical lemma follows by the convexity properties of polynomials; see [7] for a proof.
Lemma 3 For r, t ≥ 0, positive integer p, and ai ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., p, it holds
k∑
i=1
((t+ ai)
r − tr) ≤
(
t+
p∑
k=1
ai
)r
− tr.
3 A broad class of coordination mechanisms
In this section, we show that the coordination mechanism CCOORD from [7] can be thought of as be-
longing to a broad class of coordination mechanisms, which we call M(d). This class contains also our
novel coordination mechanism DCOORD, which will be presented in Section 4.
The definition of CCOORD uses a positive integer d ≥ 2 and the functions Ψj that map sets of
players to the reals as follows. For any machine j, Ψj(∅) = 0 and for any non-empty set of players
U = {u1, u2, ..., uℓ},
Ψj(U) = d!
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
.
The sum runs over all multi-sets of non-negative integers {t1, t2, ..., tℓ} that satisfy t1+ t2+ ...+ tℓ = d.
So, Ψj(U) is the sum of all possible degree-d monomials of the processing times of the jobs belonging
to players from U on machine j, with each term in the sum having a coefficient of d!. CCOORD schedules
the job of player ui on machine j in an assignment N so that its completion time is
P(ui, Nj) =
(
wui,jΨj(Nj)
wui
)1/d
.
We will extend CCOORD to define a broad class of coordination mechanisms; we use M(d) to refer
to this class, where d ≥ 2 is a positive integer. Each member of M(d) is identified by a coefficient
function γ. The coefficient functions are defined over multi-sets of non-negative integers that have
sum equal to d + 1 and take non-negative values. An important property of the coefficient functions
is that they are invariant to zeros that requires that for a multi-set A of integers that sum up to d + 1,
γ(A) = γ(A ∪ {0}). Hence, the value returned by γ depends only on the non-zero elements in the
multiset it takes as argument.
The definition of a coordination mechanism in M(d) uses the quantity Λui,j(U), which is defined
as follows for a machine j and a job ui from a subset of jobs U = {u1, u2, ..., uℓ}:
Λui,j(U) =
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
ti≥1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
. (1)
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The sum runs over all multi-sets of non-negative integers, with each integer corresponding to a distinct
player of U , so that the integer ti corresponding to player ui is strictly positive. Notice that γ is defined
over (unordered) multi-sets; this implies that symmetric monomials have the same coefficient. For
example, for the set of players U = {u1, u2} and a machine j,
Λu1,j(U) = γ({3, 0})w
3
u1 ,j + γ({2, 1})w
2
u1 ,jwu2,j + γ({1, 2})wu1 ,jw
2
u2,j.
Clearly, {2, 1} and {1, 2} denote the same multi-set and, hence, the coefficients of the (symmetric)
second and third monomial are identical.
A coordination mechanism of M(d) sets the completion time of player ui to
P(ui, Nj) =
(
Λui,j(Nj)
wui
)1/d
. (2)
when its job is scheduled on machine j under assignment N .
By simply setting γ(A) = d! for every multi-set A of non-negative integers summing up to d + 1,
we obtain CCOORD. Indeed, it is easy to see that Λui,j(U) = wui,jΨj(U) in this case.
The definition of M(d) guarantees that all its members satisfy two important properties. First,
every coordination mechanism in M(d) is anonymous. This is due to the fact that the definition of the
completion time in (2) does not depend on the identity of a player and the jobs of two different players
u and u′ that have equal processing times wu,j = wu′,j at machine j and the same minimum processing
time (over all machines) will enjoy identical completion times therein, when each is scheduled together
with a set U of other players (i.e., P(u,U ∪ {u}) = P(u′, U ∪ {u′})) or when the set of players Nj
assigned to machine j contains both u and u′ (P(u,Nj) = P(u′, Nj) in this case).
Another important property of the coordination mechanisms in M(d) is that they always induce
potential games. We will prove this is a while, after defining the function Λj(U), again for a machine j
and a set of players U = {u1, u2, ..., uℓ}, as follows:
Λj(U) =
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
. (3)
Compared to the definition of Λui,j(U) in (1), the sum in (3) runs just over all multi-sets of non-negative
integers (corresponding to players in U ) that sum up to d+ 1, without any additional constraint.
We will sometimes use the informal term Λ-functions to refer to the functions defined in both (1)
and (3). We can now state and prove the following property of Λ-functions that we will use several times
in our analysis below. For example, it will be particularly useful in order to prove that mechanisms of
M(d) induce potential games (in Theorem 5).
Lemma 4 Consider a machine j and a set of players U = {u1, u2, ..., uℓ}. Then, for every player
ui ∈ U ,
Λj(U) = Λui,j(U) + Λj(U \ {ui}).
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume i = 1. Using the definition of Λ-functions in (1) and
(3), we obtain
Λj(U) =
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
=
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
t1≥1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
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+
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
t1=0
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
= Λu1,j(U) +
∑
t2+...+tℓ=d+1
γ({t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=2
w
tk
uk,j
= Λu1,j(U) + Λj(U \ {u1}).
In the third equality, we have used the fact that the coefficient function is invariant to zeros. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5 The non-negative function Φ, which is defined over assignments of players to machines as
Φ(N) =
∑
j Λj(Nj), is a potential function for the game induced by any coordination mechanism in
M(d).
Proof. Consider two assignments N and N ′ that differ in the assignment of a single player u. Assume
that player u is assigned to machine j1 and j2 in the assignments N and N ′, respectively. Using the
definition of function Φ and Lemma 4, we have
Φ(N)− Φ(N ′) =
∑
j
Λj(Nj)−
∑
j
Λj(Nj)
= Λj1(Nj1) + Λj2(Nj2)− Λj1(N
′
j1)− Λj2(N
′
j2)
= Λu,j1(Nj1) + Λj1(Nj1 \ {u}) + Λj2(Nj2)
−Λj1(N
′
j1)− Λu,j2(N
′
j2)− Λj2(N
′
j2 \ {u}).
Now observe that Nj1 \ {u} = N ′j1 and N
′
j2
\ {u} = Nj2 . Hence, using this observation and the
definition of the completion time for u in assignments N and N ′, the above derivation becomes
Φ(N)− Φ(N ′) = Λu,j1(Nj1)− Λu,j2(N
′
j2)
= wu
(
P(u,Nj1)
d − P(u,N ′j2)
d
)
,
which implies that the difference in the potentials and the difference P(u,Nj1) − P(u,N ′j2) in the
completion time of the deviating player u in the two assignments have the same sign as desired. ⊓⊔
4 The coordination mechanism DCOORD
Like CCOORD, our new coordination mechanism DCOORD belongs to class M(d). It uses the coefficient
function defined as
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ}) =
{
1 if ∃i such that ti = d+ 1
d!d
t1!t2!...tℓ!
otherwise
for every multi-set of integers {t1, t2, ..., tℓ} such that t1 + t2 + ...+ tℓ = d+ 1.
Observe that γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ}) is very similar (but not identical) to the multinomial coefficient de-
fined as
( d+1
t1,t2,...,tℓ
)
= (d+1)!t1!...tℓ! . This is exploited in the proof of the next statement.
Lemma 6 Consider a machine j and a subset of players U = {u1, u2, ..., uℓ}. Then,
Λj(U) =
d
d+ 1
Lj(U)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
∑
u∈U
wd+1u,j .
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Proof. By the definition of Λj(U) and the coefficient function γ, we have
Λj(U) =
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
=
d
d+ 1
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
(
d+ 1
t1, t2, ..., tℓ
) ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
+
1
d+ 1
∑
u∈U
wd+1u,j
=
d
d+ 1
Lj(U)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
∑
u∈U
wd+1u,j
as desired. ⊓⊔
We proceed with two properties which relate Λ-functions to machine loads. The first one follows as
a trivial corollary of Lemma 6 after observing that
∑
u∈U w
d+1
u,j ≤ Lj(U)
d+1
.
Corollary 7 Consider a machine j and a set of players U . Then,
d
d+ 1
Lj(U)
d+1 ≤ Λj(U) ≤ Lj(U)
d+1.
The second one will be very useful in proving that DCOORD is feasible and in bounding its price of
anarchy.
Lemma 8 Let U = {u1, ..., uℓ} be a set of players. For every player ui ∈ U and every machine j, it
holds that
wui,jLj(U)
d ≤ Λui,j(U) ≤ d · wui,jLj(U)
d.
Proof. We will first expand the quantities wui,jLj(U)d and Λui,j(U). We have
Λu1,j(Nj) =
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d+1
t1≥1
γ({t1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
= wu1,j ·
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d
γ({t1 + 1, t2, ..., tℓ})
ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
(4)
and
wu1,j · Lj(Nj) = wu1,j ·
(
ℓ∑
k=1
wuk,j
)d
= wu1,j ·
∑
t1+t2+...+tℓ=d
(
d
t1, t2, ..., tℓ
) ℓ∏
k=1
w
tk
uk,j
. (5)
We can prove the two desired inequalities by comparing the corresponding coefficients of each
monomial in equations (4) and (5). Recall that, when t1 + t2 + ... + tℓ = d, the coefficient γ({t1 +
1, t2, ..., tℓ}) from (4) is equal to 1 when t1 = d. In this case, the corresponding coefficient in (5) is( d
d,0,...,0
)
= 1 as well. Otherwise,
γ({t1 + 1, t2, ..., tℓ}) =
d
t1 + 1
(
d
t1, t2, ..., tℓ
)
.
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Since t1 is non-negative and at most d− 1, we have that(
d
t1, t2, ..., tℓ
)
≤ γ({t1 + 1, t2, ..., tℓ}) ≤ d ·
(
d
t1, t2, ..., tℓ
)
,
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Feasibility follows easily now.
Theorem 9 DCOORD produces feasible schedules.
Proof. Consider player u1 and any assignment N which assigns it to machine j together with ℓ − 1
other players u2, u3, ..., uℓ. By the leftmost inequality of Lemma 8, we have that
P(u1, Nj) =
(
Λu1,j(Nj)
wu1
)1/d
≥
(
wu1,j
wu1
)1/d
Lj(Nj) ≥ Lj(Nj),
as desired. The inequality holds since, by definition, wu1,j ≥ wu1 . ⊓⊔
5 Bounding the price of anarchy and stability
For proving the price of anarchy bound, we will need the following lemma which relates the load of any
machine at an equilibrium with the optimal makespan.
Lemma 10 Let N be an equilibrium and N∗ an assignment of optimal makespan. Then, for every
machine j, it holds that
Lj(N) ≤ m
1
d+1
d+ 1
ln 2
‖L(N∗)‖∞.
Proof. Consider a player u that is assigned to machine j in the equilibrium assignment N and to
machine j′ in the assignment N˜ that minimizes the ld+1-norm of the machine loads. First, consider the
case where j 6= j′. In the equilibrium assignment N , player u has no incentive to deviate from machine
j to machine j′ and, hence, P(u,Nj) ≤ P(u,Nj′ ∪ {u}). By the definition of DCOORD, we obtain that
Λu,j(Nj) ≤ Λu,j′(Nj′ ∪ {u}). Using this observation, Lemma 4, and Lemma 6, we get
Λu,j(Nj) ≤ Λu,j′(Nj′ ∪ {u}) = Λj′(Nj′ ∪ {u}) − Λj′(Nj′)
=
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′ ∪ {u})
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
wd+1u,j′
=
d
d+ 1
(Lj′(Nj′) +wu,j′)
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
wd+1u,j′
We will now prove that the same inequality holds when j = j′. In this case, together with Lemmas 4
and 6, we need to use a different argument that exploits a convexity property of polynomials. We have
Λu,j(Nj) = Λu,j′(Nj′) = Λj′(Nj′)− Λj′(Nj′ \ {u})
=
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′)
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′ \ {u})
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
wd+1u,j′
=
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′)
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
(Lj′(Nj′)− wu,j′)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
wd+1u,j′
≤
d
d+ 1
(Lj′(Nj′) + wu,j′)
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
Lj′(Nj′)
d+1 +
1
d+ 1
wd+1u,j′ .
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The last inequality follows since zd+1 − (z − α)d+1 ≤ (z + α)d+1 − zd+1 for every z ≥ α ≥ 0, due to
the convexity of the polynomial function zd+1.
Let us sum the above inequality over all players. We obtain∑
j
∑
u∈Nj
Λu,j(Nj)
≤
d
d+ 1
∑
j
∑
u∈N˜j
(
(Lj(Nj) + wu,j)
d+1 − Lj(Nj)
d+1
)
+
1
d+ 1
∑
j
∑
u∈N˜j
wd+1u,j
≤
d
d+ 1
∑
j

Lj(Nj) + ∑
u∈N˜j
wu,j
d+1 − Lj(Nj)d+1
+ 1
d+ 1
∑
j
Lj(N˜j)
d+1
=
d
d+ 1
‖L(N) + L(N˜)‖
d+1
d+1 −
d
d+ 1
‖L(N)‖d+1d+1 +
1
d+ 1
‖L(N˜ )‖
d+1
d+1
≤
d
d+ 1
(
‖L(N‖d+1 + ‖L(N˜)‖d+1
)d+1
−
d− 1
d+ 1
‖L(N)‖d+1d+1. (6)
The second inequality follows by Lemma 3 and since
∑
u∈N˜j
wd+1u,j ≤ Lj(N˜)
d+1
. The equality follows
by the definition of ld+1-norms and the last inequality follows by Minkowski inequality (Lemma 2) and
by the fact that ‖L(N˜)‖ ≤ ‖L(N)‖.
Using the definition of norms and Lemma 6, we also have
‖L(N)‖d+1d+1 =
∑
j
Lj(Nj)
d+1 =
∑
j
∑
u∈Nj
wu,jLj(Nj)
d ≤
∑
j
∑
u∈Nj
Λu,j. (7)
By combining (6) and (7), we have
2‖L(N)‖d+1d+1 ≤
(
‖L(N‖d+1 + ‖L(N˜)‖d+1
)d+1
and, equivalently,
‖L(N)‖d+1 ≤
1
2
1
d+1 − 1
‖L(N˜ )‖d+1 ≤
d+ 1
ln 2
‖L(N∗)‖d+1
≤ m
1
d+1
d+ 1
ln 2
‖L(N∗)‖∞.
The second inequality follows since, by definition, ‖L(N˜)‖d+1 ≤ ‖L(N∗)‖d+1 and by the inequality
ez ≥ z + 1. The third inequality follows by Lemma 1. Since ‖L(N)‖d+1 ≥ Lj(Nj) for every machine
j, the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
For the price of stability bound, we will use a qualitative similar (to Lemma 10) relation between
machine loads at a particular equilibrium and the optimal makespan.
Lemma 11 Let N be the equilibrium that minimizes the potential function and N∗ an assignment of
optimal makespan. Then, for every machine j, it holds that
Lj(Nj) ≤
(
d+ 1
d
m
) 1
d+1
‖L(N∗)‖∞.
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Proof. Observe that Φ(N) ≤ Φ(N∗) since every equilibrium that is reached when players repeatedly
best-respond starting from assignment N∗ has potential at most Φ(N∗). Using this observation, the def-
inition of norms, Corollary 7, and the definition of the potential function (see the statement of Theorem
5), we have
‖L(N)‖|d+1d+1 =
∑
j
Lj(Nj)
d+1 ≤
d+ 1
d
∑
j
Λj(Nj) =
d+ 1
d
Φ(N)
≤
d+ 1
d
Φ(N∗) =
d+ 1
d
∑
j
Λj(N
∗
j )
d+1 ≤
d+ 1
d
∑
j
Lj(N
∗
j )
d+1
=
d+ 1
d
‖L(N∗)‖d+1d+1.
Hence, for every machine j, by exploiting Lemma 1, we have Lj(N) ≤ ‖L(N)‖d+1 ≤(
d+1
d
) 1
d+1 ‖L(N∗)‖d+1 ≤
(
d+1
d m
) 1
d+1 ‖L(N∗)‖∞ as desired. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to complete the price of anarchy/stability proofs. We will do so by comparing the
completion time of any player to the optimal makespan ‖L(N∗)‖∞.
Theorem 12 By setting d = O(logm), DCOORD has price of anarchy O(logm) and price of stability
O(1).
Proof. Consider a player u that is assigned to machine j at some equilibrium N and satisfies wu = wu,j∗
for some machine j∗. We will use the fact that player u (is either already at or) has not incentive to
deviate to machine j∗ at equilibrium to bound its completion time as follows:
P(u,Nj) ≤ P(u,Nj∗ ∪ {u}) =
(
Λu,j∗(Nj∗ ∪ {u})
wu
)1/d
≤
(
dwu,j∗Lj∗(Nj∗ ∪ {u})
d
wu
)1/d
≤ d1/d(Lj∗(Nj∗) + wu).
The equality follows by the definition of DCOORD, and the second inequality follows by Lemma 8. The
third inequality follows since wu = wu,j∗ and by observing that Lj∗(Nj∗ ∪ {u}) = L(Nj∗) + wu if
u 6∈ Nj∗ (i.e., j 6= j∗) and Lj∗(Nj∗ ∪ {u}) = L(Nj∗) otherwise.
Now, using Lemma 10 to bound Lj∗(Nj∗), we obtain that
P(u,Nj) ≤ d
1/d
(
m
1
d+1
d+ 1
ln 2
+ 1
)
‖L(N∗)‖∞.
If the equilibrium N is a potential-minimizing assignment, Lemma 11 can be further used to obtain the
better guarantee
P(u,Nj) ≤ d
1/d
((
d+ 1
d
m
) 1
d+1
+ 1
)
‖L(N∗)‖∞.
The theorem follows since, by setting d = Θ(logm), the factors (ignoring ‖L(N∗)‖∞ in the rightmost
expressions become O(logm) and O(1), respectively. So, in general, we have that the completion time
of any player at equilibrium is at most O(logm) times the optimal makespan (hence, the price of anarchy
bound) while there exists a particular equilibrium where the completion time of any player is at most
O(1) times the optimal makespan (hence, the price of stability bound). ⊓⊔
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